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1. WOULD PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A
U.S. CITIZEN WITHOUT CHARGE IN A MILITARY BRIG FOR SIX MONTHS
IF THAT CITIZEN-WHO LIVES IN MINNESOTA-IS SUSPECTED OF LINKS
TO AL QAEDA FOLLOWING A ONE-MONTH TRIP TO SOMALIA?
In response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, Congress enacted the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF), which gave then President George W.
Bush authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determine [d] planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."' In addi-
tion, the resolution recognized that the President had the constitu-
tional authority "to take action to deter and prevent acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States."2  One of the more
controversial actions taken by then President Bush, under this
grant of authority, was to place two American citizens-Yaser Esam
Hamdi and Jose Padilla-in military detention as enemy comba-
tants. 3 The asserted purposes of the detention were to prevent
Hamdi and Padilla from rejoining terrorist groups and to interro-
gate them about al Qaeda, the Taliban, and related terrorist
4groups.
This question of whether the President can detain an Ameri-
can citizen, in the United States, involves the scope of presidential
and judicial powers.5 Critics argue that military detention is un-
constitutional because it is "indefinite."6 Military detention is only
"indefinite" because there is no criminal conviction and sentence;
therefore, "indefinite" does not mean "forever."7 Critics also con-
tend that detention without knowledge amounts to cruel and in-
humane treatment. John Yoo argues that this assertion "flies in the
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. V 2005)).
2. Id.
3. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
4. H.L. POHLMAN, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE POST-9/11 CASES
75 (2008).
5. SUE MAHAN & PAMALA L. GRISET, TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE 347 (2d ed.
2008). I do not directly address the legitimacy of such detention, merely the legal-
ity of such detention. For a discussion of legitimacy, see Gregory S. McNeal, Insti-
tutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. REv 967 (2009).
6. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S AccOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 147 (2006) (citation omitted).
7. Id.
[Vol. 36:55114
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss5/9
TEN QUESTIONS: MCNEAL
face of centuries of wartime practice. Under the rules of war, "na-
tions have always held enemy combatants until 'the cessation of ac-
tive hostiles."' 9 Yoo asserts that until the Supreme Court ruled in
Hamdi, there had never been any suggestion that there was a re-
quirement of a fixed period to detain the enemy, nor any require-
ment of a "trial" to fix any such "sentence."'l While the war with al
Qaeda has been going on for a long period, this does not mean
that the United States should lose its right to detain captured ene-
my combatants." The war will end at some point, and only then
should detainees be released. 1
2
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court plurality of four Justices argued
that a U.S. citizen who had been designated as an enemy comba-
tant-a person who is a "part of or supporting forces hostile to the
United States or coalition partners -could be detained by the
President. The plurality reasoned that Congress's resolution au-
thorizing the President to use "necessary and appropriate force" to
counter the attacks of 9/11 was sufficient authorization for the
President to detain an enemy combatant for the duration of the' 4
conflict in which he was involved. However, those detained were
deemed entitied to a "fair opportunity" to rebut the facts on which
their detentions were based in front of a "neutral decisionmaker."'5
Because of its decision on that ground, the plurality did not reach
the issue of whether the President possesses plenary power to de-
tain under Article II of the Constitution. 6 Justice Clarence Thomas
disagreed with the plurality's "balancing act," arguing that the
compromise was an unjustified intrusion into executive power.
Justice Antonin Scalia also disagreed, arguing that a detained U.S.
citizen is entitled to a full criminal trial as long as Congress has not
suspended habeas corpus.is
The Padilla case involved a U.S. citizen, arrested in Chicago,
who was alleged to be involved in a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb"
8. Id.
9. Id. (citation omitted).
10. Id. This has since been mooted by the 2005 Detainee Act.
11. Id. at 148.
12. Id.
13. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
14. Id. at 521.
15. Id. at 533.
16. Id. at 516-17.
17. Id. at 579 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 554 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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in the United States.' 9 In preparation for this case, the Attorney
General's Office requested a memorandum from the U.S. Depart-
ment of justice, Office of Legal Counsel, addressing whether presi-
dential detention of a U.S. citizen as an "enemy belligerent" vi-
olated 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).20 The DOJ answered in the
negative. When the issue reached the Supreme Court, it held, in a
54 decision, that there was no jurisdiction and vacated the Second
Circuit's decision in Padilla's favor.2' Four justices would have
found jurisdiction based on the exceptional circumstances of the
case and affirmed the holding below that detention of this sort is
22
prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a). Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit overruled a district court judgment, which held that Padil-
la's detention by the President was not supported in law. 23 The
court held that Padilla's detention was expressly authorized by
Congress through the AUMF.24
Similarly, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a legal resident of the
United States and citizen of Qatar, was arrested at his home by FBI
agents and held as a material witness in the Government's investiga-
tion into the attacks of 9/11.2' On June 23, 2003, the Government
sought to dismiss the indictment against al-Marri and transferred
him to military custody based on an order signed by President Bush
declaring al-Marri to be an enemy combatant who was closely asso-
ciated with al Qaeda. A1-Marri challenged his detention, and the
Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the Government can "maintain
[a] terrorist suspect in military custody if the facts, as alleged by the
government, were true, but that there must be sufficient due
process to determine the veracity of those allegations. "0 6 The case
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but was mooted by Presi-
19. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, DETENTION OF AMERICAN CrrIzENs AS ENEMY
COMBATANTS 27 (2008).
20. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legislative Af-
fairs, Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to Military Detention of United States
Citizens (June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memodetentionuscitizens62 7 2002.pdf.
21. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004).
22. Id. at 455 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
23. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1062 (2006).
24. Id.
25. See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008).
26. DAN E. STIGALL, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 76 (2009).
[Vol. 36:55116
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss5/9
TEN QUESTIONS: MCNEAL
dent Obama's decision to transfer al-Marri from military to civilian
custody. Thus, the issue of presidential power to detain citizen
enemy combatants is unclear. Although the practice of detention
for the remainder of the conflict in which the enemy was involved
has been used throughout history, the new era of long-term con-
flict, introduced by the War on Terror, may lead to a significant
shift in detention practices.
2. WOULD IT BE LEGAL FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO
LAUNCH A PREDATOR STRIKE ON OSAMA BIN LADEN IF HE HAS BEEN
TRACKED TO A HOUSE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN?
Determining the legality of U.S. MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9
Reaper drone strikes within Pakistan is a complicated issue that
takes into account a number of variables, which must be weighed
independently to determine whether a drone attack is legal and
perhaps more importantly "prudent." Challenges to the legality of
the United States's use of Predator or Reaper drones to attack al
Qaeda targets within Pakistani territory typically fall into one of
three categories. The first legal challenge arises out of the poten-
tial violations of Pakistani territorial integrity and sovereignty by
launching drones from airfields inside of Afghanistan and crossing
into Pakistani airspace to conduct strikes on suspected insurgents
and al Qaeda targets. 7 The second challenge to the use of drones
arises out of alleged violations of customary international law and
the laws of war. The laws of war require a subjectively particula-
rized degree of proportionality and military necessity when attack-. ~28 ..
ing a target. The legal allegation is that the use of drones is inhe-
rently disproportional and thus constitutes a violation of
international law. The final legal challenge to the use of drones al-
so arises out of customary international law and the laws of war and
is closely related to the second challenge to the drone program.
However, it can be considered its own category, in that the drone
program fails to sufficiently mitigate civilian casualties and collater-
27. A violation of sovereignty of this nature is in violation of Article 2, para-
graph 4 of the U.N. Charter, which reads in pertinent part: "All Members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4;
see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
28. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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al damage as is reauired by the Geneva Conventions and customary
international law.
I. VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
The first legal challenge to the drone program arises from po-
tential violations of Pakistani airspace as the drones may cross the
internationally recognized border between the two nations without
clearance or permission from the Pakistani government and kill in-
surgent targets and/or substantially injure Pakistani civilians and
property.30 Such violations of sovereignty would be in violation of
the U.N. Charter Article 2, paragraph 4. The conclusion seems to
be rather straightforward that such an action is a violation of the
U.N. Charter, and is technically an act of war against Pakistan,
however this neglects the reality of the private interaction between
the United States and Pakistan. Perhaps most importantly a large
amount of evidence suggests that U.S. drones are not located in
Afghanistan, but rather are stationed principally at Shamsi and Ja-
cobadad airbases within Pakistan."' This suggests a deeper relation-
ship exists between the United States and Pakistan as it relates to
the operation of drones within Pakistani airspace. "[T]he Pakistani
government apparently has tacitly agreed that these strikes may be
undertaken without specific consent to each operation, so long as
they target 'foreign fighters' and not Pakistani Taliban, though the
existence of that tacit consent is disputed." 32 There is additional
evidence, which suggests that this relationship has been expanded
29. Id.
30. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Of course, it is entirely possible that the
Pakistani government has privately authorized such strikes even if they publicly
denounce them.
31. See generally Farhan Bokhari, Officials Confirm CIA Drones in Pakistan, CBS
NEws, Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/02/19/world/worldwatch/entry 4812368.s
html; Habibullah Khan & Nick Schifrin, Allegations That CIA Predator Drones Have
Bases in Pakistan, ABC NEws, Feb. 23, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=6938365&page=l; Greg Miller,
Feinstein Comment on US. Drones Likely to Embarrass Pakistan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/13/world/fg-uspakistanl3?pg=l; Je-
remy Page, Google Earth Reveals Secret History of US Base in Pakistan, TIMES ONLINE,
Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5 7 62 3 7 1.ece.
32. See Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US. Military Cross-Border
Operationsfrom Afghanistan into Pakistan 14 (The George Washington U. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 451, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfn?abstract_id=1296733 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 36:55118
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to allow Pakistani military and intelligence officers a greater role in
the drone program.3 The implication being that while the Pakis-
tani government may publicly protest the drone attacks, they are in
fact privately approving and participating in them thereby remov-
ing any claims arising from a violation of sovereignty.
Additional weaker arguments can be made that the Security
Council, in their resolutions concerning Afghanistan, the Taliban,
al Qaeda, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
has authorized such cross-border actions against insurgent forces.
However, none of the attendant resolutions have explicitly autho-
rized cross-border action into Pakistan by either the U.S. military or
the ISAF.
34
An additional and far more complicated argument for such an
attack, as hypothesized above, can be made that such action is au-
thorized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which states in pertinent
part "that the prohibition on the use of force embedded in Article
2(4) may be justified when acting in self-defense."35 Given that the
United States's operation in Afghanistan has been continuous since
the al Qaeda attack on 9/11, the argument can be made that the
cross-border drone strike was a permissible extension of self-
defense arising out of the original act even though it occurred sev-
eral years later.36 The basis for such an argument is significantly
strengthened by the unquestioned responsibility of Osama bin La-
den for the 9/11 attacks. However, such claims of self-defense may
be negated by violations of third-party sovereignty. Nonetheless,
even if this is a breach of United States's obligations under interna-
tional law, it may be justified as an "efficient breach." Efficient
breach holds that striking a known terrorist such as Osama bin La-
33. See generally Julian E. Barnes, U.S. AcknowledgesJoint Drone Program with Pa-
kistan, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A23; Julian E. Barnes & Greg Miller, Pakistanis
Get a Say in Airstrikes; Islamabad and the U.S. Military Team Up to Carry Out Drone At-
tacks on Militants. It Marks New Roles for Both, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at Al.
34. See generally S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); The Secretary-General, Agree-
ment on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Perma-
nent Government Institutions, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001); S.C. Res. 1386, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Dec. 20,
2001); S.C. Res. 1413, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1413 (May 23, 2002); S.C. Res. 1833,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1833 (Sept. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1510, 1 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13, 2003).
35. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 28 (citing U.N. Charter art. 51).
36. Compare id. at 28-29, with Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Terror-
ists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 COIELL INT'L L.J. 533, 540-43 (2002).
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den is preferable to allowing terrorists to remain at large solely out
of fear of infringing on territorial sovereignty. 3'
II. PROPORTIONALITY
The international laws of war speak of the rule of proportio-
nality. The principle of proportionality in international laws of war
prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force that ex-
ceeds that needed to accomplish the military objective.
Proportionality compares the military advantage gained to
the harm inflicted while gaining this advantage. Propor-
tionality requires a balancing test between the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated by attacking a
legitimate military target and the expected incidental civi-
lian injury or damage. Under this balancing test, excessive
incidental losses are prohibited. Proportionality seeks to
prevent an attack in situations where civilian casualties
would clearly outweigh military gains. This principle en-
courages combat forces to minimize collateral damage-
the incidental, unintended destruction that occurs as a re-
sult of a lawful attack against a legitimate military target."
Under the theory of proportionality the question becomes
whether a drone attack upon Osama bin Laden is a proportional
response to the threat that he poses and the attacks he has master-
minded. Facially it appears to be an open-and-shut case. A drone
attack upon the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and head of an in-
ternational terrorist organization responsible for numerous attacks
around the world appears to be a proportional response. However,
it may be legally significant that such an attack would occur within
the borders of a third-party nation. Pakistan bears no responsibility
for the attacks that precipitated the United States's armed response
into Afghanistan. 9 The United States cannot rely upon the prin-
cipals of proportionality that allowed their prior intervention into
Afghanistan. The analysis would be no different if a drone operat-
ing in Tunisia or Canada had found Osama. 40
37. See Gregory S. McNeal & Brian J. Field, Snatch-and-Grab Ops: Justifying
Extraterritorial Abduction, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 491, 520 (2007); see
also Jeffery L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law,
24YALEJ. IW'LL. 1, 31 (1999).
38. Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict: The Rules of War, ABOUT.COM,
http://usmilitary.aboutcom/cs/wars/a/loac.htm.
39. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 40-41.
40. See id.
[Vol. 36:55120
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However, an argument does exist that such action is warranted
because it is a military necessity, 4' and every nation has a right to
protect itself against international terrorism.42 This theory of de-
fense is further strengthened by the nature and importance of the
target that Osama bin Laden presents. The theory does not dis-
count the potential violations of sovereignty, but as outlined above,
Pakistan's level of complicity in the drone program may obviate any
issues arising out of potential violation of sovereignty claims.
III. CIVLIAN CASUALTIES AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE
The United States has signed and ratified the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
dated August 12, 1949. Legally, the United States is required to mi-
tigate civilian casualties and collateral damage when attacking the
enemy. Such concerns are also expressed in the theories of mili-
tary necessity and proportionality. The current drone program has
caused a number of civilian casualties and collateral damage, yet it
has continued. It is these collateral damages, which have drawn a
great amount of international attention to the drone program. In
the hypothetical, it is reasonable to expect that such civilian casual-
ties and collateral damage could potentially exist. Under interna-
tional law, military forces are not required to reduce civilian casual-
ties to zero, but only mitigate and apply the theories of
proportionality and military necessity. Overall, the program may
have some legal liability for such damages under international hu-
man rights law. However, the significance of the target and the
demonstrated difficulty in locating Osama bin Laden over nearly a
decade will likely outweigh the potential collateral damage and civi-
41. Military necessity is defined as follows:
Military necessity requires combat forces to engage in only those acts ne-
cessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. Attacks shall be li-
mited strictly to military objectives. In applying military necessity to tar-
geting, the rule generally means the United States Military may target
those facilities, equipment, and forces which, if destroyed, would lead as
quickly as possible to the enemy's partial or complete submission.
Powers, supra note 38.
42. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 43-44. See also Rein Miullerson, Jus ad Bellum
and International Terrorism, 79 INT'L L. STUD. 75, 107, 109 (2003) (finding that "ter-
rorism belongs to the domain ofjus ad bellum as terrorist attacks may constitute a
specific, non-traditional... form of an armed attack that gives rise to the right of
self-defense .... [and] the right to self-defense today includes measures underta-
ken against non-state entities"); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Ad-
visoyy Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM.J. INT'L L. 62 (2005).
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lian casualties that may result from attacking a house on the out-
skirts of Karachi. It is important to note that over the multi-year
span of the drone program, no legal challenges to any attack have
been formally brought.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first legal issue, which concerns potential violations of so-
vereignty, is mitigated by two major factors. First, the drone is most
likely to be launched from a location inside Pakistan. Second, the
Pakistani government appears to have consented to the drone pro-
gram, and additional evidence suggests that they have been taking
an increasing role in the program as a result of the fundamentalist
insurgency within their borders. The last two legal challenges to
such a strike arise out of customary international law and the laws
of war. Largely, U.S. strikes against al Qaeda have been accepted as
proportional to the 9/11 attacks. Such proportionality and self-
defense assessments are complicated by the fact that such a strike
will occur in a third-party country. The consensus opinion is that
such a strike would negate any proportionality or self-defense ar-
guments. However, the conclusion is not so clear-cut, as Pakistan is
an active participant in the War on Terror, and in the drone pro-
gram itself. Additionally, the transnational nature of al Qaeda and
the threat that it poses not only to America, but also to Pakistan
and various other nations, will likely present a valid defense that
the strike was necessary, an act of self-defense, and otherwise justi-
fiable as an "efficient breach." The last challenge is closely related
to the second in that it stems from accepted practices of warfare,
which require the mitigation of civilian casualties. This legal chal-
lenge is largely conjecture and based on the overall history of the
drone program, which has caused some civilian casualties and col-
lateral damage. These problems are more political than legal.
While there is a duty to mitigate civilian casualties, there is no legal
requirement under the laws of war to reduce civilian casualties to
43. See generally Irfan Ahmad, Role of Airpower for Counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) (June 2009) (un-
published M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501136&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (discussing
in detail the drone program, the numbers of casualties, and overall negative
treatment towards the drone program); see also Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer,
US Predator Strikes in Pakistan: Observations, THE LONG WAR J., July 21, 2009,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/us-predator-strikes 3.php
(presenting a comprehensive numerical assessment of the drone program).
5122 [Vol. 36:5
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zero. The high value nature of the target (Osama bin Laden) is
likely to outweigh any concerns presented under these three legal
constructs.
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
I. INTRODUCTION
As can be expected when determining whether al Qaeda
presents an existential threat to the United States, there are two di-
ametrically opposed schools of thought. On the one hand there is
a significant group of experts, which believe that al Qaeda is a
threat and will continue to present a threat to the United States for
potentially the next twenty years.4 On the other hand, there is a
group that believes al Qaeda has been significantly weakened and
faces significant, if not insurmountable, difficulties in mounting
additional attacks upon the American homeland. 45 However, por-
tions of this group do acknowledge that al Qaeda does present a
threat to other geographical locations. For purposes of organiza-
tion, I will first present the core argument of the first expert group
who contends al Qaeda still presents a significant threat to the
United States. Subsequently, I present the alternative argument
which addresses the position that al Qaeda does not present an ex-
istential threat to the United States. I conclude by definitively ans-
wering whether al Qaeda still presents an existential threat to the
national security in such a manner that the United States should
concern itself with actively defending against that threat.
44. See Jeff Bliss & Tony Capaccio, A-Qaeda Will Pose a Threat for 20 Years, Top
Spy Official Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 5, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aKKnTMPGelvw.
45. See generally Michael Jacobson, The Changing and Expanding al-Qaeda
Threat, THE WASHINGTON INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL', July 25, 2007,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2639; KENNETH
KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AL QAEDA: PROFILE AND THREAT
ASSESSMENT (2005).
46. See generally KATZMAN, supra note 45; Megan McArdle, Existential Threats,
THE ATLANTIC, June 25, 2008,
http://meganmcardle.theadantic.com/archives/2008/06/existential-threats.php
(discussing terrorism threats to the United States in general); John Mueller, The
US Terrorist Threat is Overblown, NEW PERSp. Q., Summer 2008,
http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2008-summer/18_mueller.html.
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II. AL QAEDA PRESENTS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES
The most recent Congressional Research Service Report to
specifically address the issue of whether al Qaeda presents a threat
to the United States summed up this first group's perspective:
Al Qaeda leadership remains in contact with, and possibly
even in control of numerous Islamic militant cells and
groups that continue to commit acts of terrorism, such as
the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London underground
transportation system. According to those who subscribe
to this view, Al Qaeda as an organization has not been
weakened to the degree that some Administration officials
assert, and the global effort against Islamic terrorism
would benefit significantly from finding and capturing Al
Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and his top associate,
Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subscribers to this view believe that a
coordinated attack on the scale of September 11 should
not be ruled out because the remaining Al Qaeda struc-
ture is sufficiently well-organized to conduct an effort of
that magnitude.
While al Qaeda has been significantly restricted in its opera-
tions since 2001 due to U.S. military operations and coordinated
global action by law enforcement agencies, the very nature of al
Qaeda's leadership model has allowed them to consistently replace
fallen or captured leaders.48 Regardless of the individual leader-
ship, the group remains dedicated to terrorist acts upon the United
States, and prevailing intelligence has shown their desire to obtain
weapons of mass destruction and detonate them inside the United
States."
Declassified elements of the 2007 National Security Estimate
contends that al Qaeda is for all intents and purposes a resurgent
organization, recovered from the initial shock of the United
States's response to the 9/11 attacks. The terrorist organization
has all "elements needed to plan and carry out an attack against the
United States, including key leadership, operational lieutenants,
and a safe haven in the federally administered tribal areas of Pakis-
tan. The NIE suggests that any al Qaeda attack inside the United
47. KATZMAN, supra note 45, at Summary.
48. Bliss & Capaccio, supra note 44.
49. Id.
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,,50States would likely involve operatives coming from outside.
III. AL QAEDA DOES NOT PRESENT AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES
The Congressional Research Service defines this second group
of al Qaeda analysts as those who:
[B] elieve that the Al Qaeda organization and its leader-
ship are no longer as relevant to assessing the global Is-
lamic terrorist threat as they were on September 11, 2001.
Some believe U.S. and allied counter efforts have wea-
kened Al Qaeda's central leadership structure and capa-
bilities to the point where Al Qaeda serves more as inspi-
ration than as an actual terrorism planning and execution
hub. According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has
been replaced by a threat from a number of loosely affi-
liated cells and groups that subscribe to Al Qaeda's ideol-
ogy but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qae-
da leaders. Those who take this view believe that
catastrophic attacks similar to those on September 11,
2001 are unlikely because terrorist operations on that
scale require a high degree of coordination. 51
Essentially, this second group asserts that although al Qaeda
once presented an existential threat to the United States, it no
longer does so. Operational losses in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as increased global pressure on terrorist groups, have effective-
ly changed the global terrorism landscape. The current trend in
international terrorism is "homegrown" terrorists that have little if
52any affiliation with al Qaeda. Overall, the terrorist organization
has been forced to reassess both its mission and role. While al
Qaeda is still an operational threat, its focus has shifted to more of
a leadership role of the larger jihadist movement with al Qaeda
leadership serving to direct the ideological, motivational, andS • 53
propaganda campaigns as an umbrella organization. As a result
of its presently limited capabilities, al Qaeda has chosen to focus
upon these new leadership functions as well as direct its operation-
al efforts towards "fomenting unrest in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Per-
50. Jacobson, supra note 45.
51. KATZMAIN, supra note 45, at Summary.
52. RAPHAEL PERL, CONGRESSIoNAL RESEARCH SERVIcE, TRENDS IN TERRORISM:
2006 (2006).
53. Id. at Summary.
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sian Gulf states, and countries neighboring Israel."5
John Mueller, in his assessment of al Qaeda's threat, presents a
unique numerical analysis, which relies upon assessments and anal-
ysis by University of Pennsylvania professor and retired intelligence
officer Marc Sageman. Sageman contends that there are essentially
three groups of al Qaeda members. The first group numbers a few
dozen members left over from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The second group consists of perhaps 100 fighters from the 1990's.
The third group consists of sympathizers and potential jihadists
spread over the world that remain connected via the Internet.
55
Mueller contends that terrorism violence outside of warzones
which can be attributed to al Qaeda has totaled between 200-300
persons, less than the number of persons who drown in U.S. bath-
tubs ever year.56 Additionally, since 2001, the FBI has yet to uncov-
er an al Qaeda terrorist cell in the United States. All told, the
numbers and abilities of al Qaeda do not add up to an existential
threat against the United States.
57
IV. CONCLUSION
The vast amount of empirical evidence strongly suggests that al
Qaeda has shifted their focus to leading and mentoring the global
jihadist movement, which has become arguably a loose confedera-
tion of terrorist organizations principally concerned with local op-
erations. However, al Qaeda has not renounced their desire to car-
ry out operations inside the United States. The evidence does not
suggest that this shift in operational focus is a permanent one. Ra-
ther, it may only be a temporary strategy designed to maintain their
global extremist influence while endeavoring to strike again at the
American homeland. The organization has already demonstrated
its ability to do so. Until such time when there exists concrete evi-
dence that al Qaeda is effectively shattered and no longer has the
means and capabilities to strike at America, considering them any-
thing but an existential threat to the United States would be a gross
underestimation of their demonstrated strategic resilience, re-
sourcefulness, and deadly dedication to their cause.
54. CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AL
QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY (2007).
55. Mueller, supra note 46.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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